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Chapter Five
Environmental Justice in a Dryland
Democracy: A Comment on Water
Basin Institutions
Eileen Gauna
I. Introduction
Prof. Janet Neuman, in Dusting Offthe Blueprintfor a Dry/and Democ
racy: Incorporating Watershed Integrity and Water Availability Into
Land Use Decisions (Dry/and Democracy), puts forth an elegant case

for reconsideration of John Wesley Powell's 1878 principles to develop
the arid western United States. 1 The thrust of her proposal is the estab
lishment of basin wide institutions with consolidated regulatory author
ity. In this context, basin is assumed to be an entire water system, from
the point of its origin; it would include all supporting tributaries and the
associated groundwater and land uses that affect that system. As such, a
water basin could include western river systems that span several states.
The project would involve consolidating authority from numerous
federal, tribal, and sub-federal authorities with jurisdiction over water
allocation, pollution control, and land use decisions that affect the bas
ins' ecosystems.
1. JoHN WESLEY POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF
THE UNITED STATES, WITH A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE LANDS OF

UTAH, H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 45-73 (2d Sess. 1878). See also WALLACE
STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN WESLEY POWELL

AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST (1954).
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In support of Professor Neuman's proposal are portions of Powell's
blueprint that are most pertinent to the oversettled arid West of the 21st
century. Powell's early vision might seem utopian to some, and the po
litical difficulty of accomplishing the task of consolidating authority far
too unrealistic. Nonetheless, Professor Neuman argues that this ap
proach might be the only ecologically viable way to manage water re
sources and, despite the difficulty of getting there, it is an approach that
must be seriously considered. Otherwise, the integrity of our West's
precious water resources will continue on the path to inevitable envi
ronmental destruction caused by overuse, aggressive plumbing (bring
ing water from distant basins through engineering), and water-intensive
land uses (such as uncontrolled growth and excessive groundwater
pumping) that affect the availability, flow, and quality of surface wa
ters. Our present framework of fragmented jurisdiction cannot really
address the multiple demands on the West's rivers and lakes, and our
legacy of acrimonious water wars will just get worse. In short, she ar
gues, a radically different alternative is not utopian; it is necessary. It is
difficult to disagree with that proposition.
That said, however, there are obvious complications in dusting off
Powell's blueprint, primarily because it was designed and written as a
forward looking document, a plan to develop the West in a manner in
tensely mindful of the area's aridity. As it turned out, Powell's advice
was ignored, and as Professor Neuman acknowledges, in many respects
it is simply too late to reverse engineer the damage. Instead, the funda
mental principles in Powell's 1878 blueprint must be employed in the
21st century to do a much more difficult job. Not only is the arid West
ecologically distressed by rapid urbanization and inappropriate land
uses-a condition described and explained in Dry/and Democ
racy-but the West is also fraught with existing social, economic, and
environmental inequities. As Professor Neuman discusses, some of
these inequities are themselves the result of the skewed economies and
the resulting environmental damage to water basins. In particular, the
extensive plumbing allows entrenched vested interests, notably highly
subsidized agribusiness and growing municipalities, to appropriate wa
ter from great distances. As a result, many rural areas and indigenous
communities, as well as farm workers and immigrant communities, are
often left with poor quality, scarce, polluted, and high salinity waters.
This comment to Dry/and Democracy will expand upon the theme of
social costs, exploring how Professor Neuman's basic proposal-water
basin institutions with centralized authority-might address some of
these inequities. There are not only serious environmental justice issues
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that must be addressed by a water basin institution, but there are also
special complications that would arise during the initial process of con
solidating authority. Before that discussion proceeds, however, a brief
history of the environmental justice movement is set forth for the bene
fit of readers who might not be familiar with this sociopolitical develop
ment. Following that introduction is a discussion of water-related
environmental justice issues that a water basin institution might be expected to address.
This chapter takes a slightly different approach geographically,
drawing upon examples taken largely from the Southwest instead of the
Pacific Northwest, the geographic region that Professor Neuman uses to
draw many examples in Dry/and Democracy. In part, this approach is to
allow the reader to better compare and appreciate the regional differ
ences throughout the arid West. But in addition, the ecological prob
lems in the Southwest are more dire simply because water is more
scarce. For example, in 15 minutes, more water flows down the Colum
bia River in Oregon than flows in the entire state of New Mexico in a
year.2 This situation means that the conflicts among interests that give
3
rise to water disputes are all the more fierce. Moreover, due to the scar
city of surface waters, there are fewer opportunities for diversions from
other rivers or lake systems, leaving excessive pumping of groundwater
to quench the thirst of growing urban centers a more attractive alterna
tive. Thus, land use issues are particularly important in protecting lake
and river ecosystems. In addition, as recently noted by Prof. Dan
Tarlock, the type of agricultural practices in the northern part of New
Mexico and southern Colorado is atypical. Instead of the large-scale
fanning practices of agribusinesses, farming in this area is organized
around acequias, a communal sharing of ditch irrigation systems that is
4
closely tied to Hispanic cultural traditions. This system is fiercely de2. ALLEITA BELIN ET AL., TAKING CHARGE OF OURWATER DESTINY: AWA
TER MANAGEMENT POLICY GUIDE FOR NEW MEXICO IN THE 21sr CENTURY
33 (1000 Friends of New Mexico 2002).
3. For an enlightening example of one interstate dispute, see G. EMLEN HALL,
HIGH AND DRY: THE TEXAS-NEW MEXICO STRUGGLE FOR THE PECOS
RIVER (2002).
4. A. Dan Tarlock, Remarks at the Natural Resources Journal Symposium,
University of New Mexico (Apr. 12, 2003). See also Ruben 0. Martinez, So
cial Action Research, Bioregionalism, and the Upper Rio Grande, in CHI
CANO CuLTURE, ECOLOGY, PoLmcs: SUBVERSIVE KIN 58 (Devon G. Pefia
ed., 1998).
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fended not only because of the water, but because it is intrinsically tied
to communal values and cultural identity.
Although the Southwest shares much in common with the arid West
generally, there are additional challenges present in the Southwest that
can be used as a lens to explore the environmental justice implications
of basinwide management. An exhaustive discussion of these diverse
issues is not possible in a comment of this scope. Instead, the environ
mental justice issues are raised with a view toward advancing the dis
cussion of an alternative system based upon consolidated authority at
the basin level, and how water-dependent communities with meager re
sources and little political influence might fare under such a system.
II. Environmental Justice Issues Under the Current System
"Environmental justice" is a term used to self-consciously describe a
political movement that is centered around grassroots organizing with a
mission to address both the unequal distribution of environmental bur
dens and amenities, and the impediments to fair process that serve to ex
clude low-income and communities of color, tribal governments, and
indigenous people from important decisions about their environments
and their lives. Environmental justice is tied to a broader mission of so
cial and economic justice. Although organizing begins at the local level
and is guided by principles of environmental justice that were collec
tively adopted in 1991, 5 local organizations often affiliate with net
works6 and address regional, national, and international issues as well.
Often, the term "environmental justice" is used as a catchphrase to
describe the conditions that gave rise to the movement. For example, in
dividuals that are familiar with the phrase often associate environmen
tal justice with controversies over the siting of large hazardous waste
facilities, because those were the first high-profile issues that caught
the public's attention. 7 Of course, indigenous communities, people of
5. PROCEEDINGS, THE FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OF CoLOR ENVIRONMENTAL
LEADERSHIP SUMMIT xiii (Oct. 24-27, 1992) (Principles of Environmental
Justice), available at http://www.hawo.org/pdf/02NuclearRacism.pdf (last
visited June 19, 2003).
6. Some of the networks include the Asian Pacific Environmental Network, the
Southwest Network for Economic and Environmental Justice, the Indige
nous Environmental Network, the African-American Environmental Justice
Network, and the National Black Environmental Justice Network.
7. See CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY, AND REGULATION 3-6 (2002) for a descrip-

Environmental Justice in a Dryland Democracy: A Comment on Water
Duin Institutions
175

color, and the poor are also disparately located near constellations of
other risk-producing and noxious land uses, such as concentrated ani
mal feeding operations, mining operations, chemical plants, refineries,
power plants, nuclear plants and storage facilities, steel mills, landfills,
sewafe treatment facilities, military bases, airports, and Superfund
sites. For example, one can find several poor African-American com
munities interspersed among the petrochemical plants along the stretch
of the Mississippi River from New Orleans to Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
an area commonly referred to as "Cancer Alley."9 Or one might find
communities ringed by industrial facilities and landfills, such as Chi
cago's far South Side, 10 or the communities nestled among the oil refin
eries of the Gulf Coast region.11 Tribal governments are often solicited
by the U.S. government and other private developers for the use of tribal
lands for the placement of mining, nuclear waste facilities, and other intensive polluting energy projects.12
But proximity to risk-producing land uses, or siting controversies in
volving new or expanded facilities, are not the only environmental jus
tice issues that activists have addressed in the last 15 to 20 years. They
have also uncovered and examined race and class disparities in a wide

8.
9.

10.
11.

12.

tion of the initial siting challenges and a history of the environmental jus
tice movement.
Id.
This is an area between Baton Rogue and New Orleans. Marianne Lavelle,
Saying "No" to Cancer Alley, in Marianne Lavelle et al., Unequal Protec
tion: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992,
at Sl-SI2, S5 (a special investigation).
Marianne Lavelle, Community Profile: Chicago, An Industrial Legacy, in
Lavelle et al., supra note 9, at S3.
See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY P1t0IECT, ACCIDENTS WILL HAP
PEN: POLLUTION FROM PLANT MALFUNCTIONS, STARTUPS, AND SHUT
DOWNS IN PORT AR.THUR, TEXAS (2002), available at http://www.rffund.
org/ei�docs/ReportOnUpsets.pdf (last visited May 11, 2003); ENVIRONMENTAL
INTEGRITY PROJECT, SMOKING GUNS, SMOKING FLARES, AND UNCOUNTED
EMISSIONS FROM REFINERIES AND CHEMICAL PLANTS IN PORT ARTHUR,
TEXAS (2002), available at http://www.rffund.org/eip/docs/SmokingGuns.
pdf (last visited May 11, 2003); Eileen Gauna, Fairness in Environmental
Protec tion, 31 ELR 10528, 10554-57 (May 2001) (discussing proposal
to allow refineries to obtain expedited permits and other favorable regulatory treatment).
See generally Indigenous Environmental Network website, athttp://www.
ienearth.org (last visited May 11, 2003).
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range of agency activities carried out by federal and sub-federal agen
cies. For example, environmental justice advocates have challenged the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the way that policy is
developed and implemented, programs designed, standards set, facili
ties permitted, laws enforced, and contaminated sites cleaned up. 13
They have challenged transportation policies, 14 examined beach aer
cess, 15 and contested the placement of parks and green spaces. 16 Activ
ists have also addressed a myriad of process issues as well. In the course
of addressing environmental issues, they have often found themselves
cut off from effective participation by a variety of obstacles. 17 Some
times, it has been due to the hostility of other stakeholders and govern
mental officials. 18 Other times, it has been due to lack of time,
resources, and technical experts. But there are more subtle impediments
to effective participation and advocacy. The way that decisionmaking
structures are designed, and the biases embedded in them, often serve to
assume away, trivialize, or eclipse environmental justice issues. 19 Thus,
analyzing these power structures and decisionmaking processes, and
devising strategies for negotiating the unequal playing field of environ
mental protection, land use, and water law, is "bread and butter" envi
ronmental justice work. By virtue of their intimate connection to the
land and their economic vulnerability, environmental justice communi
ties fully appreciate, perhaps better than most stakeholders, that the is
sues cannot be reduced to simplistic jobs or environment choices. N
13. Eileen Gauna, An Essay on Environmental Justice: The Past, the Present,
and Back to the Future, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 701, 705 (2002).
14. See Environmental Justice Resource Center, Transportation Equity, at
http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/transequnews.htm (last visited May 11, 2003).
15. Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movements of
the 1970s in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil
Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719 (1996).

16. Samara F. Swanston, Environmental Justice and Environmental Quality
Benefits the Oldest, Most Pernicious Struggle and Hope for Burdened Com
munities, 23 VT. L. REV. 545 (1999).

17. See generally Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Par
ticipation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1998).
18. An interesting account of this hostility can be found in Luke W. Cole, The
Struggle of Kettleman City: Lessons for the Movement, 5 Mo. J. CoNTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 67 (1993/1994) (describing a pennit hearing for an incinera
tor in Kettleman City, California).
19� For a description of this dynamic in the pennitting process, see REcHT
SCHAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 7, at 187-215 and Gauna, supra note 11.
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issues that environmental justice activists and advocates address are di
verse, complex, and persistent.
Some of those issues involve water; in particular, water allocation,
pollution, and the associated land uses that affect water quantity and
quality. More often than not, in the environmental justice context these
disputes involve fundamentally different values, cultures, and ways of
perceiving this precious natural resource. Some examples follow.

A. Water Flow and Availability
A river's natural hydrological cycle, or flow regime, includes periodic
flooding and other "keystone" processes. 20 In order for a river to remain
healthy and alive, some conservationists argue that dams, drains, and
diversions should attempt to mimic the natural hydrograph of the river.
For example, one conservationist proposes the creation of a levy system
that allows the natural overbank spring flows to promote regeneration
of cottonwoods, speed decomposition and recycling of nutrients, or
carry off or dampen understory fuels.21 To preserve endangered species,
there is also the need to keep flows higher than might otherwise occur
under allocations and diversions presently allowed under the existing
water rights regime. These are but a few examples of the changing state
of conventional wisdom. In place of the aggressive plumbing projects
of the empire builders of past generations, the idea now is to keep rivers
in their natural state and leave as much water in them as possible. Both
of these ideas find support in Dry/and Democracy and Professor
Neuman's discussion of Powell's vision of a sustainable West. In the
abstract, this sounds like an ecologically sound idea, but to do so under
the West's existing system of water rights will put intense pressures on
current water users. The fundamental question remains: which users are
likely to be the most vulnerable to increased scarcity in the amount of
water available for diversion and consumptive uses?
One of the losers in this ecological project might be the acequia com
munities of northern New Mexico and southern Colorado, communities
that are already struggling to maintain a traditional vision of shared wa
ter use, which is at odds with the current law of prior appropriation. The
case of the acequias in Colorado's Rio Culebra Watershed provides a
good example of these vulnerabilities. In this discussion I draw largely
20. William deBuys, Navigating the River of Our Future: The Rio Poco
Grande, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 265, 270 (2001).
21. William deBuys was speaking of the Middle Rio Grande District in New
Mexico. Id. at 275.
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upon the work of anthropology professor Devon Pena and law professor
Gregory Hicks. Professors Pefi.a and Hicks, in a recent work, carefully
map out the history and the social and legal complexities ofthe acequia
communities of southern Colorado.22 I also draw heavily from the work
of David Benavidez, an attorney who works closely with acequia com
munities in northern New Mexico. 23
Other than Native American tribal governments, acequia communal
arrangements are among the oldest local governmental institutions in
the United States. 24 They are centered around a system of building and
maintaining intricate, gravity-fed ditch irrigation systems that rely
heavily upon knowledge oflocal topography and environmental condi
tions and farming techniques that are passed from generation to genera
tion. The acequias are not simply irrigation and farming technology,
but stable cultural practices, norms that gave rise to a strong sense of
community identity. 25 Hicks and Pefi.a have identified five major princi22. Gregory A. Hicks & Devon G. Peiia, Community Acequias in Colorado's
Rio Culebra Watershed: A Customary Commons in the Domain ofPrior Ap·
propriation, 74 Cow. L. REV. 101 (2003).

23. David Benavidez, The Social Costs of Moving Water in Northern New Mex
ico (unpublished manuscript) (manuscript on file with author).
24. Hicks & Peiia, supra note 22, at 155.
25. Hicks and Peiia explain:
Intense social relationships on the acequia create a sense of
what Gallegos calls the "acequiahood," the neighborhood of
irrigators or the condition of a sense of place embodied by the
affinities of belonging to the acequia institution. The sense of
neighborliness is reinforced by the annual cycles of labor activ
ity. This involves not just the spring ditch cleanup but a wide
range of other activities related to irrigating, planting, cultivat
ing, harvesting, and processing of crops. The circumstances of
limited economic resources means the acequia farmers must
rely on mutual aid strategies to survive. Thus, it is common for
acequia farmers to share resources including labor, farm trac
tors, plows, cultivators, combines, and other implements, seed,
and even land.
The traditions of mutual aid and cooperative labor are evident
in the organization and objectives of the [Colorado acequia As
sociation]. The Association's mission statement highlights this
commitment to mutual aid and cooperative labor by declaring
that the acequias are a "local grassroots participatory democ
racy." This participatory democracy extends to labor processes.
It is common among the Culebra acequias for participantes to
participate in the planting, cultivating, and harvesting of each
other's crops. Elder farmers like Adelmo Kaber and Evan

Environmental Justice in a Dryland Democracy: A Comment on Water
Basin Institutions
179

ples that dominate this governance: ( 1) individual usufructuary rights to
a common pool resource that emphasizes the community instead of the
commodity value of water; (2) the nontransferability of water; (3) the
right of thirst; (4) the practice of cooperative labor or mutual aid; and
(5) the principle of local self-govemance.26 This form of self-gover
nance has placed acequia communities at odds with a strict priority sys
tem ofprior appropriation that was imposed under the U.S. legal system.
The ancient customary law of acequias finds its roots in Roman,
Spanish, Arabic, and Pueblo Indian sources.27 It differs from current
state laws in several ways. In times of scarcity, water is not viewed as
private property but as a common resource to be allocated based upon
principles of equity and necessity.28 Because water is viewed as intrin
sic to the land, it is not sold for use outside the acequia system. So
Valdez assist younger farmers with this work and in the process
share their local knowledge of agroecology. For example,
Adelmo Kaber often makes suggestions to younger farmers
about the appropriate crops for a given soil type or recom
mends the least erosive techniques for plowing fields before
planting. The reproduction of local agroecological knowledge
is therefore completely dependent on the intimate social rela
tions that characterize the interactions among elder and more
youthful participantes.
The Association has over the years emphasized the impor
tance of reproducing the next generation of acequia farmers. A
concern for the needs of limited resource farmers extends to the
provision of services for women and youth who are just starting
to engage in agricultural work. One strategy has been to provide
new farmers with support in acquiring heirloom seeds, gaining
access to planting, cultivating, and harvesting equipment, and
mentoring them in the arts of flood irrigation. The sharing of re
sources also involves an infonnal network of seed savers and
exchangers. In fact, the practice of heirloom seed saving is one
of the most significant cultural traditions among acequia farm
ers of the Culebra watershed. Heirloom seed saving represents a
connection to past generations and is an important
agroecological adaptation to place ....
Id. at 162-63 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 160.
27. Id. at 157. This presents a legal complication, as the acequia rights are cus
tomary, Pueblo and tribal rights evolve under federal law, and prior appro
priation has evolved under various state laws that may differ in significant
respects. See also Benavidez, supra note 23, at 2 (discussing the historical
background of acequias).
28. Hicks & Pena, supra note 22, at 113.
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strong is this norm that some communities (through individual rights
holders) have even rejected lucrative offers to buy water rights in times
of plenty. 29 A complementary principle, the "right of thirst," holds
that water is also for the benefit of the plants and animals of the
acequia ecosystem, and because of that principle, acequia communi
ties have resisted the Colorado State Engineer's request to line ditches
with cement. 30 Not only is the right of thirst more in line with current
ecological thinking, the wild plants and animals that the banks of the
acequias support are important sources of food or medicine for the
acequia communities. 31
Some states recognize the acequia system in limited respects. For ex
ample, New Mexico provides that the acequias themselves are tenan
cies in common, and acequias are political subdivisions of the state, but
the water rights are privatized, a feature not recognized under prior sov
ereigns. 32 To successfully operate within a regime of individual prop29. As Hicks and Peiia note:
These customary principles are not abstractions or mere
memories of a cultural heritage and political legacy that has
long since past. Despite the imposition of the appropriative
rights regime, these principles continue to guide the organiza
tion and management of contemporary community acequias
throughout the Upper Rio Grande. For example, in 1989, a
Houston-based multinational corporation, Battle Mountain
Gold (BMG), offered the San Luis People's Ditch $50,000 for
temporary water during the construction of a gold mine and cy
anide leach vat milling facility located in the Rito Seco Creek
watershed about six miles northeast of the town of San Luis.
The People's Ditch firmly rejected the offer on two separate oc
casions in years when plenty of water was available for all the
acequias. As the former mayordomo of the San Luis People's
Ditch explained, "You cannot sell the water and separate it from
the land. The water belongs to the community. It is not for sale."
Instead of selling BMG water, the San Luis People's Ditch
and other local acequias filed a lawsuit against BMG opposing
the corporation's plans to transfer agricultural water rights to
industrial uses. This incident illustrates how the riparian and
community value of water remain fundamental principles
guiding the management of acequia water rights in the
Culebra watershed.
Id. at 161-62.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Benavidez, supra note 23, at 3.
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erty rights, acequia communities have collectively found ways around
the legal results of prior appropriation. For example:
The 2002 drought was so severe that only three of the twenty-three

acequias were apportioned water sufficient for irrigation. Many of

the farmers were thus left high and dry. Where circumstances per
i
mtted, fanners from dry acequias planted on extra acreage on land
belonging to fanners with rwming acequias. For example, Adelmo
Kaber, a farmer on the Cerro Ditch without water for the 2002 irri
gation season, planted chicos, beans, calabasa and other crops on
several acres belonging to Joseph C. Gallegos, who was able to ir
rigate with water from the San Luis People's Ditch.
In this manner, the acequia farmers of the Culebra watershed
manage to find new ways to share scarcity. Because the extant le
gal regime of prior appropriation does not allow for the sharing of
water scarcity, the farmers cooperate by growing food together on
the limited land that can be irrigated. Of course, while these adap
tive responses to water scarcity are laudable, they do not eliminate
the economic hardship that results wherever ditches run dry under
the restrictive demands of priority calls for limited water. The prin
ciple of the right of thirst is abrogated, and participantes (partici
pants in the system) are prevented from managing their water
33
resources on the basis of collective goals of the community.
Careful not to romanticize, the authors note that this arrangement is
compelled by strict necessity. Everyone in the acequia system, from the
mayordomo (ditch boss), to the comisionados (commissioners), to the
participantes understand that the whole system depends upon feasance
to these norms. The maintenance of the irrigation system depends upon
shared labor and values. Thus, even the most senior rights holders are
34
not individually secure under a system of strict prior appropriation.
33. Hicks & Pena, supra note 22, at 166-67.
34. Hicks and Pena explain:
[T]he very holders of senior water rights, who benefited from
the priority established by Colorado water law, believed that
their own interests would be jeopardized if the holders of junior
rights were forced to sell their land and water rights because of
continuing scarcity. The possible shift of water away from
acequia-dependent uses threatened the end of the acequias as a
water delivery system and as a political, economic, and social
institution vital to the cohesion of the community.
A new generation of uses that neither depended upon the
acequia system nor provided usable return flows to the
acequias would reduce the total volume of water carried
through the acequias, frustrating the ability of the earthen ditch
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The acequia communities, having survived for generations under a
foreign legal regime, are nonetheless endangered today. They are
threatened by the press of a globalized economy where large multina
tional corporations increasingly dominate economic activity with wa
36
35
ter-intensive industries, increasing pressure to sell water rights, the
influx of new landowners into the system that do not adhere to the com
munal norms, and multiplying residential developments in the area. A
case from New Mexico is illustrative.
37
In Wilson v. Denver, the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether an election of a mayordomo and the comisionados was
legal by a one vote per landowner arrangement, as is customary, or
whether the vote should have been in proportion to water rights shares
per hour. The facts of the case demonstrate the vulnerability of this an
cient system. The dispute arose when the Wilson family, headed by Dr.
John N. Wilson, who owned a 750-acre ranch upstream from 20
acequia households, piled manure from their Norwegian fjord houses
too close to the acequia. The downstream landowners were concerned
about damage to the acequia system and potential contamination of do
mestic water wells. The local acequia association offered to help build a
new fence to keep the horses away from the acequia. The Wilson family
refused their offer, considering such an attempt an interference with
their property rights. During the 1994 and 1995 elections of the
mayordomo and comisionados, the Wilsons asserted that their vote
should count in proportion to their shares, which would have given
networks to operate. Another basis of concern was that the com
munity of labor that has maintained the ditch system at rela
tively low cost would be undermined if land in the watershed
were separated from the acequia system. Neighbors would no
longer look to each other to keep the system up. At a certain
point there would be too few owners to maintain the acequia
system, and those who remained would lack the resources to
purchase services to replace the many acts of mutual aid and
forbearance that define the acequia neighborhood and allow it
to function. The successor system, and the successor landscape,
would, it was feared, be inferior with respect to functionality
and to amenity.
Id. at 154-55.
35. See discussion of the Intel case, infra note 41 and accompanying text.
36. See discussion of the offer to purchase water rights by BMG, supra note 29.
37. 961 P.2d 153, 156-57 (N.M. 1998). For a discussion of this case, see
Cristopher J. DeLara, Who Controls New Mexico's Acequias? Acequia Gov
ernment and Wilson v. Denver, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 727 (2000).
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them 61 % of the vote. Using their proportional vote would have al
lowed the family to place John and Barbara Wilson into commissioner
positions and Nat Wilson as mayordomo. The acequia community re
fused, instead holding the election in a customary one vote per land
owner manner. The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the one vote
per landowner election results, but the facts of the case illustrate
how an acequia community, dependent upon voluntary compliance
with communal norms, is vulnerable to existing laws and institu
tions that may not be as accommodating to the traditional forms of
acequia governance.
Another vulnerability is the legal ability of individual water rights
holders to sever the water rights from the acequias. This potential exists
because in the last three decades the Southwest has experienced much
wetter conditions than average. Thus, what is commonly thought to be
"drought conditions" in the last few years is in fact a return to the long
38
term average rainfall. This return to normal aridity may result in prior
ity calls over several years. Junior rights holders might not be able to
survive the scarcity over a prolonged period, even with informal land
sharing arrangements with senior rights holders. If they sell their land and
water rights to individuals or corporations that reject the norms of the
acequia system, these new landowners are more likely to transfer water
rights outside of the ditch system, leaving the remaining participants in
39
the legally untenable position of having to challenge the transfers.
Many of the landowners in acequia communities are Latino families
that have few resources and economic options--other than land that has
remained in their families for generations-and as such, the demise of
the system will have a racially disparate impact. The viability and au
40
tonomy of these communities is an environmental justice issue.
Whether these endangered communities will fare better under a water
basin institution with consolidated authority from federal and state
law regimes is a matter that may be far too speculative to allow for
much comfort.
Groundwater pumping is another issue that raises environmental jus
tice concerns. Because there is comparatively little surface water, popu
lation growth in parts of the Southwest has been supported by

38. BELIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.
39. See Sleeper v. Reynolds, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
40. See Devon G. Pena, Lecture: Autonomy, Equity, and Environmental Justice,
Provost's Lecture Series on Race, Poverty, and Environmental Justice,
Brown University (Apr. 21, 2003) (manuscript on file with author).
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groundwater. This trend has threatened the viability of the aquifers and,
by hydrological connection, the water basins. It also pits agricultural ru
ral communities against cities and incoming industries. Again, another
case out ofNew Mexico is illustrative. In the early 1990s, the Intel Cor
poration applied to the New Mexico State Engineer to acquire a permit
to pump 4,500 acre-feet per year (1.5 billion gallons per year) of
41
groundwater to expand its facility near the village of Corrales. The
42
residents of Corrales were concerned about a variety of issues, but a
chief concern was that their domestic water wells would be affected by
43
Intel's use of so much water. Many of the estimated 2,728 domestic
wells were located near the Intel well site. The Corrales residents antici
pated that many of these wells would require additional drilling or sub
44
mersible pumps. Intel made the usual economic arguments, asserting
that the expansion would result in additional jobs and indirect benefits
45
from increased economic activity. The State Engineer allowed the
permit despite his prediction that some domestic wells in the area would
need to be redrilled or deepened. He did not directly apply New Mex
46
ico's "public welfare" criterion to the transfer and instead noted that
decisions regarding growth and economic development are better deter41. This case is discussed at length in a student note. See Susanne
Hoffman-Dooley, Determining What Is in the Public Welfare in Water Ap
propriations and Transfers: The Intel Example, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 103
(1996).
42. As in many environmental justice disputes involving facility siting or expan
sions, there were a range of concerns. The residents were also concerned
about air quality, waste disposal, increased traffic, and indirect subsidies
through tax abatement, which were estimated at about $250,000 in abate
ments per job created. Id. at 117. For this and other examples of high tech in
dustry subsidies and their effect on water resources, see SOUlllWESI'
ORGANIZING PROJECT, INTEL INSIDE NEW MEXICO: A CASE STUDY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC INJUSTICE (1994) [hereinafter INTEL IN
SIDE NEW MEXICO]; SournwEST NETWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND
ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND CAMPAIGN FOR RESPONSIBLE TECHNOLOGY, SA
CRED WATERS: LIFE BLOOD OF MOTHER EARTH, FOUR CASE STUDIES OF
HIGH-TECH WATER RESOURCE EXPLOITATION AND CORPORATE WELFARE
IN THE SournWEST (1997).
43. Hoffman-Dooley, supra note 41, at 115.
44. Id. at 116.
45. Id. at 117.
46. The public welfare criterion is a requirement that before approving a water
transfer or diversion, the state engineer should determine that the water
transfer should be in the public welfare.
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mined through local zoning and land development authority. 47 This ex
ample evidences the fairly typical tendency of regulatory agencies that
deal largely with scientific and engineering issues to avoid socioeco
nomic factors.48 With regulators' inclination to avoid socioeconomic is
sues, the more powerful interests with greater resources to purchase
water rights will inevitably prevail, notwithstanding the serious social
costs that may ensue.

B. Water Quality
There are also serious water quality issues facing environmental justice
communities in the Southwest. In general, water pollution is direct and
obvious, such as contaminated runoff, facility effluent, and deposition
of air pollutants into surface waters. But there are less obvious reasons
why water pollution affects people of color, native populations, and the
poor more than the general public. The key to this fact lies in the way
that the Clean Water Act (CWA) is administered.49 Under this Act,
point sources (factories, for example) must acquire a permit before dis
charging pollutants into a body of water. There is very little in the way
ofmandatory requirements for nonpoint sources, e.g., agricultural prac
tices that result in pesticide and fertilizer runoff. The point sources are
required to use technology-based standards to control the pollutants in
their discharged effluent. As the term suggests, these standards are
based upon control technology currently available, and when combined
with similar dischargers and nonpoint runoff on the same water body,
the water can be severely polluted despite the fact that none of the pol
lutants are entering the river or lake illegally. In an attempt to avoid or
correct this situation, the CWA requires states to designate the uses for
each body of water and adopt water quality standards for the designated
use. For example, a "fishable-swimmable" designated use requires wa
ter quality adequate to support those uses, i.e., that pollutant levels will
be low enough so that the fish caught and consumed will be safe to eat.
If the water body does not meet the water quality standards for various
47. Id. at 119 (citing In re the Applications of Intel Corporation to Appropriate
the Underground Waters of the State of New Mexico in the Rio Grande Un
derground Water Basin, Nos. RG-57125 et al. (June 10, 1994)).
48. Gauna, supra note 17, at 35-36.
49. For a good overview of the CWA, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 33 U.S.C.
§§1251-1387, ELR STAT. FWPCA §§101-607, and its administration, see
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCI
ENCE, AND POLICY 569-699 (4th ed. 2003).
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types of pollutants, additional planning and control measures are sup
posed to be put into place.
However, the environmental justice concerns arise in the process of
developing water quality standards that will determine whether the wa
ter is clean enough to support a healthy fish population in the first in
stance. EPA develops water quality guidelines that the states may
adopt. This endeavor requires an assumption about how much fish peo
ple typically eat. Initially, EPA assumed that the average person con
sumed about 6.5 grams per day of fish caught in the same water body
over a 70-year period, approximately one eight-ounce serving per
month. In the fall of 2000, due in large part to pressure from environ
mental justice advocates, EPA revised its criteria to 17.5 grams per day
for the general population and recreational fishers, and 142.4 grams per
50
day for subsistence fishers. However, many federal and state water
quality standards currently in effect are still based upon the old 6.5
grams per day standard. The reason this is such an important environ
mental justice issue is explained in a recent report by the National Envi
ronmental Justice Advisory Council to the EPA Administrator:
The contamination of fish, aquatic plants, and wildlife is an espe
cially pressing concern for many communities of color, low-in
come communities, tribes, and other indigenous peoples, whose
consumption and use practices differ--often profoundly ser-from
those of the general population. Members of these groups often
consume far greater quantitjes of fish, aquatic plants and wildlife;
they consume fish, plants and wildlife at different frequencies, in
accordance with seasonal availability and other cultural consider
ations; they consume and use different species and parts; and they
employ different methods in procuring and preparing the fish,
aquatic plants and wildlife that they use. Thus, communities of
color, low-income communities, tribes and other indigenous peo
ples are among the most highly exposed to contaminants in the
fish, plants, wildlife, and aquatic environment. For example, em
pirical studies document 90th percentile fish consumption rates for
various affected communities and tribes at 225 [grams per day
(g/day)], 242 g/day and 489 g/day (respectively, urban fishers on
Los Angeles Harbor, Cal.; Asian and Pacific Islander communities
50. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY CoUNCIL, FISH CoN
SUMPTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, A REPORT DEVELOPED FROM
TIIE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL MEETING
OF DECEMBER 3-6, 2001, at 30 (Nov. 2002 and Addendum dated Dec. 2002),
available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/eyfish_
consump_report_l 102.pdf (last visited May 11, 2003).
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in King County, Wash.; and the Suquamish Tribe). Although
EPA's revised default assumptions of 17.5 g/day, representing the
90th percentile of the general population, and 142.4 g/day, repre
senting the 99th percentile of the general population are a marked
improvement over its previous assumption of 6.5 g/day, the re
vised defaults still considerably underestimate exposure for many
affected communities and tribes. 51

Clearly, a water basin institution with a mission to preserve the integrity
of the basin ecosystem must address the issue of water quality stan
dards, point and nonpoint pollution. A consolidation of authority only
over water allocation and land use laws would not be sufficient; the
basin institution would have to have delegated federal authority un
der environmental laws, for example authority to adopt water qual
ity standards.
Another major problem with achieving even existing (insufficiently
protective) standards is that pesticide and fertilizer runoff, as well as
other nonpoint pollution, has continued virtually unregulated under the
CWA. Within the last few years, there has been increased regulatory ac
tivity around a planning provision that requires states to come up with
total maximum daily load (TMDL) plans for water quality limited wa
ters.52 These plans are supposed to bring in nonpoint source pollution
control as well. However, as explained by Prof. Oliver Houck, this kind
of ambient-based regulation is hampered by the limited state of science
and the substantially limited state of political will. 53 If states were to
delegate TMDL.planning and implementation authority to a water basin
institution (assuming it were legal to do so), the institution would en
counter the same difficulties and the same powerful interest groups that
have resisted TMDL planning. And the basin institutions would have to
devise a way to increase the capacity for meaningful participation of en
vironmental justice communities within this planning process, a feat
that has yet to be accomplished under current regulation. Another par
ticularly difficult task for a basin institution will be controlling air pol
lution, particularly the deposition of mercury, which comes largely
from power plants. Mercury, and other toxins that bioaccumulate in the
fatty tissues of fish, is very harmful. Under current law, mercury air
emissions air controlled by technology-based standards based upon
51. Id. at 3-4 of Addendum.
52. Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 ELR 10469 (Aug.
1999).
53. Id.
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maximum achievable control technology ((MACT) standards), but the
Bush Administration is vigorously promoting a "Clear Skies Initiative"
in the fonn of proposed legislation that will allow power plants to trade
emission allowances and will delay mercury controls required under
current law. Depending upon how these types of trading regimes are de
signed-and they are often designed to provide maximum flexibility
for facility operators-then "hot spots" can occur when a large facility
or group of facilities decides to buy emission allowances rather than in
stall stringent pollution control. It might be exceedingly difficult, if not
impossible, for a water basin institution to control deposition of air
borne mercury into water bodies under this type of regime.
One might reason that a water basin institution, with land use author
ity within the basin ecosystem, would be able to better exercise control
over new facility siting and facility expansions and would do so with an
eye toward protecting the river or lake and, indirectly, the populations
that rely upon that water body. But under the current system, these
emission- and effluent-increasing activities continue to take the path of
least resistance and end up in indigenous, low-income, and people of
54
color communities. More so, perhaps, in the demographically chang
ing arid West. Recent studies from the Los Angeles area strongly sug
gest that the statistical community of choice for siting unwanted land
uses is a community undergoing an ethnic shift from one community of
color to another. The authors of this study posit that social ties are weak
ened when a community is experiencing a population transition; there
fore, these communities are even less able to organize and challenge a
55
facility siting or expansion. Add to these land use problems the limited
54. In two studies, Prof. James Hamilton has looked at how capacity decisions
of hazardous waste facilities correlate with the demographics of host com
munities. In the first, using data at the county level, Professor Hamilton
found that race and income were not significant factors in expansion deci
sions by facilities from 1987 to 1992, but that race was a significant determi
nant of the facilities' plans to reduce capacity of waste facilities (facilities in
white communities were more likely to reduce capacity than facilities in
communities of color). Hamilton also found that both race and income were
significant predictors of where hazardous waste facilities were sited in the
1970s and early 1980s. James T. Hamilton, Politics and Social Costs: Esti
mating the Impact of Collective Action on Hazardous Waste Facilities, 24
RAND J. ECON. 101 (1993).
55. Manuel Pastor Jr. et al., Which Came First? Toxic Facilities, Minority
Move-in, and Environmental Justice, 23 J. URB. AFF. 1 (2001). Nicholas
Targ, Counsel to the EPA Office of Environmental Justice, has written a law
review article on the related "social capital" theory. Nicholas Targ, Three
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options that people of color have due to the legacy of expulsive zon
ing, 56 the unfortunate reality that low-income and people of color com
munities are often the buffers between risk producing land uses and
more wealthy residential areas, and other intensive zoning practices. 57
The result is that a basin institution willing to accept plenary authority
will have challenges that do not rest exclusively with water flow, avail
ability, and quality. Sound policy necessitates a broader mission to con
trol and correct indirect but significant social costs.

C. The Clash of Values
The scenarios described above illustrate that, in environmental justice
issues, what are at stake are not just competing economic uses of water,
but important noneconomic values as well. Native American tribes are
willing to go to great lengths to preserve their sovereignty. Tribal sover
eignty aside, sacred sites and certain uses of water are intrinsic to their
land-based religions. 58 Acequia communities are fiercely protective
of cultural traditions tied to the communal ditch system. These inter
ests cannot be balanced easily against the interests of powerful eco
nomic actors.
Officials within a basin institution will have to be mindful that the ag
gregate of water allocation, land use, and pollution control decisions
can result in racially disparate distributions of burdens and benefits. In
dividual decisions can exacerbate existing racial disparities. The design
of the decisionmaking structure of the institution can further erode prinPaths to the Environmental Justice Goal: Social Capital, Going Beyond
Meaningful Public Participation (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with
author and available from Nicholas Targ). See also Nicholas Targ, A Third

Policy Avenue to Address Environmental Justice: Civil Rights and Environ
mental Quality and the Relevance of Social Capital Policy, 16 TuL. ENvrL.

L.J. 167 (2002). A study at the zip code level found that after controlling for
other demographic variables, race was not a significant variable in explain
ing facility capacity expansion, but that the potential for collective action (as
measured primarily by voter turnout) was a significant variable. James T.
Hamilton, Testing for Environmental Racism: Prejudice, Profits, Political
Power?, 14 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 107, 121-27 (1995).
56. Yale Rabin, Expulsive Z.Oning: The Inequitable Legacy ofEuclid, in ZONING
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold s. Kayden eds.,
1989).
57. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Jus
tice and Land Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. l (1998).
58. See infra Part III.
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ciples of sovereignty of Native American tribal governments. These
values will be certain to compete with the economic interests of major
water users such as large-scale agriculture, industry, and municipalities.
To add to the complexity ofthe situation, racially disparate results and
damage to religious practices implicate principles embedded in the U.S.
Constitution and civil rights laws.
In light of these considerations, these issues cannot, and should not,
be resolved solely by resort to markets and the principle ofeconomic efficiency, which is premised upon a willingness-to-pay criterion. Yet,
just as existing institutions confront the growing demand by powerful
interest groups to promote and facilitate trading in water rights and pollution credits, a basin institution will be subject to the same pressures.
Wealthier stakeholders, such as the major water users and industry
moving to the arid West, are the primary beneficiaries ofsuch a system.
Even assuming that water transfers and tradeable pollution credits
are more strictly controlled than market proponents envision, there are
still inherent difficulties in balancing economic interests against
noneconomic interests under the current regulatory regime. For exampie, Prof. Tseming Yang notes that civil rights claims have fared badly
in the environmental regulatory context precisely because environmental law is largely an interest balancing process, whereas the nature ofadjudication and discourse under civil rights laws are premised upon a
paradigm ofmaximizing the ri�hts ofminorities who have historically
9
been subject to discrimination. The policy underlying pollution control laws, in particular, accepts pollution as a necessary consequence of
our standard ofliving and, within that context, does not easily allow for
a more narrow focus of protection of one group of stakeholders. 60
Whether a basin institution will be able to protect aquatic ecosystems,
while at the same time protecting the autonomy and community of the
poor and people ofcolor who might be operating under a different set of
values, will depend upon its design and implementation. Basin institutions that are no more than vessels of consolidated authority will not
suffice. Something more is necessary.

59. Tseming Yang, Balancing Interests and Maximizing Rights in Environmen
tal Justice, 23 VT. L. REV. 529, 529-30, 534 (1999).
60. Id. at 534-35.
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Ill. Environmental Justice Under a Water Basin Institution
A. Consolidating Authority
Before discussing how environmental justice concerns might fare under
a basin management approach, it is important to anticipate the process
of consolidating authority. To be sure, an agency's penchant for turf
guarding will be the biggest political obstacle. And Professor Neuman
is correct in pointing out that agency power so jealously guarded is illu
sory to begin with, considering that it ultimately ends up simply as the
power to guard power, or defend decisions, in protracted court proceed
ings. But there is a special consideration in what might otherwise appear
to be a dysfunctional tendency of governmental institutions. That con
sideration concerns the sovereignty of Native American tribes. Tribal
sovereignty has been steadily under attack for decades, and every legal
challenge to this sovereignty brings increasing concern for tribal gov
ernments. 61 State and tribal governments along large rivers are actively
involved in disputes and acrimonious litigation with each other. Tribes
might be understandably hesitant to give up guarded tribal authority to
basin management institutions with no experience, and no track record,
of addressing intersovereign disputes. Moreover, this is not the run-of
the-mill conflict between and among different levels of government. As
explained by Prof. Rebecca Tsosie, at issue is tribal self-determination
that is indispensable to protecting very specific sets of values that differ
2
from mainstream western values.6 A case involving water quality stan
dards and the Isleta Pueblo provides an example.
63
In City ofAlbuquerque v. Browner, the Isleta Pueblo promulgated a
set of comparatively stringent water quality standards that would pro-

61. The most recent high profile case is Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indi
ans of the Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony, cert. granted, 123 S.
Ct. 618 (2002), vacated, 123 S. Ct. 1887 (2003) (holding that a tribe is a
not a "person" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §1983). One of the questions
presented by the petitioners was whether the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity enables Indian tribes, their gambling casinos, and other com
mercial businesses to prohibit the searching of their property by law en
forcement offices for criminal evidence pertaining to the commission of
off-reservation state crimes when the search is pursuant to a search warrant
issued upon probable cause.
62. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determina
tion: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowl
edge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 226-27 (1996).

63. 97 F.3d 415, 27 ELR 20283 (10th Cir. 1996).
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tect the tribe's use of the Rio Grande for ceremonial purposes. The up
stream city of Albuquerque protested, in large part because discharges
allowed under a water treatment facility's national pollutant discharge
elimination system permit would cause a violation of the water quality
standards in the downstream segment used by the tribe. Ultimately the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld EPA's approval of
the tribe's water quality standards. One has to wonder how this case,
not only involving different uses of the water resource but involving
a conflict of fundamentally different cultural and religious values,
would be resolved under the processes of a basinwide institution
with consolidated authority spanning several states. One also has to
wonder ifNative American tribes will be amenable to giving up the
protection of hard-fought legal victories upon a blind faith in a newly
created water-basin institution with a larger set of stakeholders. As
such, the consolidation process itself must have substantial partici
pation by tribal governments, and there would have to be concrete
assurances that noneconomic cultural values will be preserved by the
basin institution and that U.S. trust responsibility is fully recognized
and implemented.

B. Potential Benefits
Assuming such assurances are made, that federal, state, and local law is
changed to allow for the creation ofbasinwide institutions with expan
sive consolidated authority, and that sufficient resources are allocated
toward that end, one can easily imagine the potential benefits of such a
regulatory regime. A basinwide institution that has sufficient authority
over water allocation, including groundwater pumping and agricul
tural, industrial, and other land use practices, is much better posi
tioned to address cross-media problems. In fact, a water body is
perhaps the best "indicator media." Just as the presence and plentitude
of certain species are indicative of the overall health ofan ecosystem,
such as an old growth forest, the health of a water body is similarly in
dicative of the overall health of the regional land ecosystem as well. A
free-flowing water body that can support healthy native aquatic spe
cies can be accomplished only by controlling soil and groundwater
contamination, fertilizer and pesticide runoff, deposition ofair pollut
ants, sediment from construction, and runoff of pollutants from as
phalt and other impervious surfaces. In this respect, basin institutions
have the potential to serve the broader purpose of addressing cross
media pollution problems.
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The more direct environmental justice benefits are equally attractive.
Populations that rely on subsistence fishing will not have to continue to
suppress their historical intake of protein due to frequent fish adviso
ries. A basinwide approach seems better equipped to prevent toxic hot
spots caused by too many point source discharges in one area and is
better equipped to address the cumulative pollutant load from multiple
source contributors, including nonpoint sources.
There are additional advantages to a basin institution with authority
over land use matters. It will be better positioned to curb subsidies that
not only result in inappropriate highly intensive water use, as described
by Professor Neuman, but it can curb subsidies that result in additional
pollution. A good example of this can also be found in New Mexico,
where the issuance of an industrial revenue bond for the Intel facility
was questioned on the grounds that the facility would use an enormous
amount of water and emit highly toxic chemicals as well. 64 As a result,
curbing subsidies for plumbing, intensive water uses, and less direct
subsidies that potentially impair water quality ultimately will result in
abundant free flowing clean water throughout the basin.
C. Potential Pitfalls
As appealing as this idea is from an ecological perspective, however,
there might be hidden distributional problems and social costs. If there
is more water left in the river system to support adequate flow for a ro
bust system, then there will be less water for residential, agricultural,
commercial, and industrial uses associated with any given river system.
The risk of a priority call under prior appropriation law will be more
likely, or at least it might be perceived to be more likely.65 One has to
contemplate what this new economic dynamic might mean for water
right holders in more poor areas, where the residents own land but have
little money or economic development. Will this result in displacement
of modest but stable communities? Could this in tum have a racially dis
proportionate effect on people of color throughout the Southwest? It
seems unlikely that a water basin institution-even if well run and un
deniably devoted to the public interest-would be able to ward off some
of the effects of the inevitable water scarcity that an ecosystem ap
proach would generate. These inequities are likely to become more
64. INTEL INSIDE NEW MEXJCO,
65. BELIN ET AL.,

supra note 2.

supra note 42, at

12-19, 56-60.
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acute as public trust and public welfare standards are replaced by pri
66
vate markets.
Aside from the economic questions, there are fundamental questions
of process and how the water basin institution will govern and resolve
competing interests. In Dry/and Democracy, Professor Neuman sug
gests that this management approach might be more amenable to
place-based decisionmaking. However, there are obvious difficulties
accomplishing this in large river systems that span several states and
contain numerous tributaries. Once water law, land use, and environ
mental regulatory authority are consolidated, very powerful vested
stakeholder interests will become actively engaged in the inevitable tug
of war over implementation policy and the interpretation of the statutes
and regulations involved. In addition to the usual private stakeholders,
there will be another group of powerful stakeholders-the very agen
cies that ceded authority to the water basin institution to begin with.
Particularly when the basin institution is involved in planning and
rulemaking, the stakeholders most likely to participate are those with
significant regulatory interests and economic stakes, such as the major
water users. Non-major water users and parties that may be indirect'l;
7
impacted by water decisions do not participate in the current system,
and there is little to suggest that would change. Lack of participation is
not necessarili due to lack ofinterest, but rather lack oftime and techni
cal resources. One way to avoid this unfortunate result is for the water
basin institution to play an active role in building the capacity of envi
ronmental justice communities to participate in the process. However,
agencies typically profess a studious philosophy of neutrality toward
stakeholders. Understandably, these governmental institutions do not
like to be accused of preferring one set of stakeholders over others.
While adherence to a such policy may be admirable in the abstract,
hands-off neutrality ultimately allows regulatory processes to be domi
nated by well-financed interest groups. Since we are already in the
realm of radical alternatives, a basin institution would do well to reject
the "neutral umpire" proclivities ofits predecessor agencies. Moreover,
aggressively building participatory capacity can bring substantial bene
fits to the basin institution, especially along western river systems.

66. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (discussing New Mexico
State Engineer's decision on Intel application).
67. Consuelo Bokum. Implementing the Public Welfare Requirement in New
Mexico's Water Code, 36 NAT. REsouRCES J. 681,689 (1996).
68. Gauna. supra note 17.
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Some residents of rural communities bring with them a particular type
of knowledge that is hard to come by, even by the bevy of biologists,
ecologists, engineers, lawyers, and other experts that inhabit regulatory
agencies. Long-time residents, by virtue of their intimate connection
and dependency on the physical environment over long periods of time,
understand the river.
How the water basin institution will design its processes to garner the
greatest range of participation possible is an important question.
Equally important, however, are the substantive principles and stan
dards that will guide the use of its considerable discretionary authority.
As illustrated above, some of the most difficult conflicts involve the
clash between the economic needs of industrial, agricultural, and urban
users, and the noneconomic needs of communities with land-based reli
gions, such as the sacred sites and ritual uses of Native American tribes.
Also at issue are uses that do not fit easily into either category, such as
the interests of acequia communities that use the irrigation ditch system
in part for subsistence crops, in part for crops that they sell, but whose
use is tied to a strong cultural tradition that is indispensable to the iden
tity and cohesion of very old communities struggling to survive in the
21st century. While many state laws contain public welfare standards
that can be used to provide some guidance, this standard may be unde
fined, poorly defined, or inconsistently defined by the various states
within the basin institution's jurisdiction. 69 Juxtapose this poorly de
fined concept with the inexorable march toward private markets in
western water allocation and in pollution control, and one can easily
predict the winners and the losers. Unless basin institutions are care
fully designed under a different regulatory paradigm, regulation in a
dryland democracy can very easily morph into a brutal zero-sum game.

D. Some Exploratory Thoughts on "How To"
Before the picture gets too bleak, there are encouraging signs of hope
for the problematic scenario, that is, one involving vulnerable commu
nities, severe environmental problems, fractured jurisdictional authori
ties, and powerful, entrenched special interests. The Interagency
Working Group on Environmental Justice, convened under former
President William J. Clinton's Executive Order on Environmental Jussupra note 7. See also Teresa McQueen, In the Matter of Howard
Sleeper: A Debate Over Public Welfare and the Needs ofa Diverse State, in

69. Bokum,

BEYOND LmGATION: CASE STUDIES IN WATER RIGHTS DISPUTES

79-101
(Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Leigh A. Jewell eds., Envtl. L. InsL 2002).
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70
tice, sponsored a group of demonstration pilot projects. These projects
might provide some insight into how, through the collaborative process,
there is some hope for overcoming some of these difficult obstacles.
Many of the collaborative efforts were well underway before the In
teragency Working Group formally adopted them as demonstration pi
lot projects. They typically involved a range of stakeholders, including
an impacted community, private businesses, and local, state, and fed
71
eral authorities. Some of them involved high-level elected officials,
neighborhood associations, tribal governments, and migrant farm
7
workers. 2 The typical mission involved addressing high pollution bur
dens in relatively small geographic areas. Many of the conditions in
these areas had been left unaddressed for years, and frustrated commu
nities often had an acrimonious relationship with various agencies and
the private firms that were contributing to the high pollution burdens.
Simply, political conditions were not ideal.
One particularly interesting project involves Barrio Logan, a low-in
come Latino community in San Diego that is beset by a range of private
polluting entities, in addition to the nearby port and a military base that
73
is exempt from some of the major environmental laws. Children's
health, a value that cannot be easily weighed against economic inter
ests, was of primary concern to the residents. The Environmental
Health Coalition (EHC), a sophisticated environmental justice organi
zation, had documented high exposure levels, high levels of asthma and
other respiratory illnesses, cancer, and reproductive problems, and had
debated the evidence with reluctant officials and private firms for years
in other fora. As one EHC representative noted, they were skeptical and
not interested in another failed "partnership" or a committee that would
not get anything done. Nonetheless, they reluctantly joined the collabo
rative project and it has had moderate success, although not without
having to overcome substantial obstacles. Not all major stakeholders
participated. For example, U.S. Navy officials did not want to talk to
non-Cabinet level officials and declined to join the project. This was a
significant obstacle because the Navy repairs and changes out compo-

70. Exec. Order No. 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice
in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629
(Feb. 11, 1994), codified at 3 C.F.R. §859 (1995).
71. For a sample of the projects, see RECHTSCHAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 7,
at 404-09.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 411-14 for a description of this project.
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nents ofits nuclear carriers in the area. There was ongoing, collateral
litigation between some of the stakeholders. But the participants went
forward despite these drawbacks.
Although the project is not a wild success, what is instructive is an
analysis of the obstacles, and how they were overcome, by the various
participants. At a forum convened by the International City/County
Management Association to examine collaborative models, the partici
75
pants talked candidly about their experience in Barrio Logan. One fac
tor identified as key to a successful collaboration was the presence ofa
sophisticated environmental justice organization with credibility in the
community. There were other conditions that were also helpful, such as
facilitation by persons knowledgeable about environmental justice is
sues. In addition, some participants had resources to commit to the pro
ject and the community was able to conduct an independent technical
review of monitoring results and inventories of pollution sources. Par
ticipants in the Barrio Logan project agreed to set aside debates over ev
idence and focused on the goals of the collaborative effort. Lastly, state
agency officials were careful to communicate to the communities what
they could do and what they were not able to do for the community
given various constraints on the agency. The EHC took agency person
nel through "toxic tours" in the area, which served a critically important
educational function. One agency, the California Air Resources Board,
devoted substantial resources to information gathering.
What one can glimpse from this project is a strong sense that outsid
ers cannot build a collaborative process, no matter how well-inten
tioned or talented the participants might be. Community members
persevered through several years of frustrations and setbacks because
they had a trusted alliance with an organization with a good track re
cord. The facilitator did not allow powerful economic stakeholders to
dominate the process with endless debates about evidence and instead
focused on the goals and means to acquire needed information and re
duce pollution loads. The project survived because the goal-protect
ing children's health-was something all participants viewed as
important enough to work through difficult issues.
A basin institution, even if it has plenary legal authority, will be suc
cessful only ifparticipants can trust that the process has true integrity. If
74. Id. at 412.
75. For a report of this meeting, see ICMA, FORUM ON BUILDING COLLABORA
TIVE MODELS TO ACHIEVE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE-MAY 17 & 18,
2001, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND (2002).
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it is dominated by powerful water interests, the result will be a continua
tion of water wars and litigation. Or if the basin authority proceeds with
a single-focus mission to protect the water resource ecologically with
out due consideration of the social costs that might be generated, the re
sult will be the displacement of communities. One way to attempt to
avoid these unintended consequences is to pursue aggressively capac
ity building and collaborative approaches. As important as these pro
cedural approaches are, however, they may have limited value if the
laws favor unfettered market approaches to water allocation and pol
lution control.
One of the most promising substantive standards in water law is the
requirement, adopted by several states, that a request for water alloca
tion or transfer should be approved only if it is consistent with the public
welfare. This criterion should be fully developed. The standard is insuf
ficient if a determination that allocated or transferred water will be put
to a beneficial use is a per se satisfaction of the public welfare standard.
A more nuanced analysis should be applied. For example, the basin in
stitution can consider who is primarily benefitted from the water trans
fer and who is burdened, and in particular its effect on rural economic
76
development. Another set of criteria could be developed for a trans
fer's effect on land-based religious practices or long standing traditions.
Environmental laws have similar standards that can be used; for exam
ple, permitting provisions contain omnibus authority to consider such
things as "the protection of health," "the protection of welfare," or the
"social costs" imposed as a result of a facility's location or processes.77
76. In the acequia context, attorney Benavidez proposes the following criteria
for proposed transfers:
• Does only one person benefit in the move-from community
or do many people?
• Is whatever benefit occurs a one-time benefit or does [sic]
benefits recur over time?
• Is the water right severed from the community or does owner
ship remain in the community?
• Is the new economic activity flowing from the water right oc
curring in the community or is it removed from the community?
• Does the transaction contribute to the economic development
of the community or does the transaction perpetuate, or even
wor sen the state of underdevelopment that existed?
• Is agricultural land taken out of production or not?
Benavidez, supra note 23.
77. See Gauna, supra note 11, at 10538, for a discussion of the use of this authority.
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Land use provisions such as buffer zones and development restrictions
can also be used; planning tools such as impact statements and �lanned
growth strategies can be required and given substantive effect. 8 All of
these mechanisms can and should be used to fairly balance the ecologi
cal needs of the basin with the anticipated economic and social costs.

IV. Conclusion
In the final analysis, in order for a basin institution to accomplish what
institutions have failed to do thus far, it will have to self-consciously
confront fundamental ideological conflicts such as whether water is
primarily a public resource or primarily for economic exploitation,
whether all interests are on equal footing or whether there are some in
terests-such as rights of minority populations or the sovereignty of
tribes-that should receive maximum protection, and whether the insti
tution will adhere to the principle of an unfettered market or not. The
basin institution must necessarily adopt a mission much broader than
one of protecting the water basin's ecological integrity. It must do so
without further injury to vulnerable populations, without displacement
of old communities, and without further impainnent of tribal sover
eignty and self-determination. Enhancing ecosystem integrity and do
ing so without generating these social costs is certain to run up against
the enduring expectations of powerful interest groups that have con
trolled water use for generations. One way to promote ecological sus
tainability in a socially responsible manner is to create an institution
that commits resources to building participatory capacity, develops a
tradition of respect for the experience and knowledge of populations
historically tied to the river system, uses well-thought out collaborative
approaches, and uses legal standards and discretionary authority in a
courageously protective manner. It is only when difficult social issues
are confronted, not only in design but also in ongoing implementation,
that the promise and civil potential of a true dry land democracy can
be realized.

78. See Arnold, supra note 57.

